Is parapsychology a pseudoscience?
Is parapsychology a pseudoscience?
This is genuinely contested terrain — not in the sense that the question is unanswerable, but in the sense that serious scholars disagree about the right analytical framework for answering it, and the answer depends heavily on which criteria of pseudoscience you apply.
What “pseudoscience” actually means — and why it’s complicated
The term “pseudoscience” is itself philosophically unstable. Henry Bauer [5] argues that invoking “pseudoscience” as a category label entails a form of scientism — the assumption that “science” has a single, clearly demarcated boundary that experts can reliably draw. Bauer’s analysis of how the label gets applied in practice (to topics like parapsychology, cold fusion, and others) suggests the term functions more as a social verdict than a precise methodological one, since neither “science” nor “pseudoscience” has a universally agreed definition [5].
The question of demarcation — what separates science from non-science — is a classical problem in philosophy of science that remains unresolved. Applying any demarcation criterion to parapsychology therefore inherits that unresolved problem.
How parapsychology fares against common pseudoscience criteria
Christopher French [1], a psychologist with a critical orientation toward parapsychology, directly examined this question by applying several of the most widely cited pseudoscience criteria — including Mario Bunge’s characterization as summarized by James Alcock (1981) — to parapsychology. His analysis found a mixed picture:
- Some pseudoscience criteria do not apply to parapsychology at its best: the field does not evade peer review, does not rely purely on subjective or initiate-only knowledge, and does engage with mathematics and formal methods.
- Some criteria do apply in a limited sense: parapsychology lacks a confirmed theoretical framework and has historically involved claims about immaterial entities that sit outside mainstream physics.
- On balance, French [1] concluded that parapsychology fares reasonably well against pseudoscience criteria when evaluated at its most rigorous — though he is careful to distinguish between the field at its best and the broader popular or low-quality end of psi research.
This is a notable concession from a skeptically oriented researcher: even critics applying Bunge-style criteria do not find parapsychology cleanly meets the pseudoscience standard.
The dismissal as a social and institutional phenomenon
Gerhard Mayer [3] documents something researchers in the field experience directly: the label “pseudoscience” is applied to parapsychology in ways that function as disqualification by naming rather than methodological analysis. The physicist Gerhard Vollmer’s flat assertion — “Parapsychology is a pseudoscience” — is cited [3] as an example of a verdict delivered without engagement with specific methodological criteria, and Mayer notes this kind of labeling has concrete gatekeeping effects: the word “parapsychology” alone can close off access to conferences and publication venues, independent of the quality of any particular study.
Mermelstein and German [2] categorize parapsychology alongside astrology as “counterintuitive pseudoscience” — claims that violate folk intuitions about objects and people — and explore why such beliefs propagate despite that counterintuitiveness. Their framing treats the pseudoscience classification as settled, but their focus is cognitive and social (how the beliefs spread) rather than methodological (whether the label is warranted).
The definitional problem cuts in multiple directions
Bauer [5] makes an additional point worth noting: the absence of a stable definition of “pseudoscience” means that judgments about which fields qualify are not reproducible across critics. The same cold fusion, the same polywater, the same parapsychology research can be labeled differently depending on which demarcation criterion the analyst prefers — and no single criterion has achieved consensus in philosophy of science. Bauer treats this as a reason to be cautious about the label’s use, not as a defense of any particular anomalous claim.
Skeptical critiques
What critics argue. The most systematic skeptical case in the retrieved sources is Alcock’s (1981) characterization of pseudoscience, as summarized by French [1], and Vollmer’s (2017) flat assertion cited by Mayer [3]. The core claim is that parapsychology lacks a confirmed theoretical background, posits entities (disembodied minds, non-local information transfer) incompatible with established physics, and has failed after more than a century to produce a replicable, theory-generating result.
What the sources show. French [1] — himself a skeptically oriented researcher — found that applying those same criteria carefully produces a more nuanced verdict than the flat dismissal: the most methodologically rigorous parapsychology research does not meet several of the defining features of pseudoscience (evasion of peer review, purely subjective epistemology, no formal methods). The criteria that do apply — lack of confirmed theory, anomalous ontological commitments — are real but are shared by other frontier areas of science that are not routinely labeled pseudoscience.
Analysis. The sources retrieved do not present a unified position. French applies demarcation criteria systematically and reaches a qualified “not cleanly pseudoscience at its best” conclusion [1]. Mayer documents the social and professional consequences of the label being applied non-analytically [3]. Bauer argues the category itself is ill-defined and its application reflects scientism as much as methodology [5]. Mermelstein and German use the label without examining whether it is warranted [2]. No source retrieved here presents a rigorous methodological argument that parapsychology meets all or most pseudoscience criteria; the strongest skeptical claims in the sources are either brief assertions or drawn from secondary characterizations.
For a broader look at how ESP-Nexus approaches the evidence base for parapsychology research, the Foundations and Methodology sections of the site engage with the epistemological questions in more depth.
References
- French, C. C. (2008). Is Parapsychology a Pseudoscience. Anomalistic Psychology.
- Mermelstein, S., & German, T. C. (2021). Counterintuitive Pseudoscience Propagates by Exploiting the Mind’s Communication Evaluation Mechanisms. Frontiers in Psychology, 12. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2021.739070
- Editorial Good and Bad Gatekeeping in Anomalistics Gerhard Mayer In April this year I took part in the workshop “Gatekeeping in Science”, organized by the two philosophers Katherine Dormandy and Fede. (2024). Zeitschrift für Anomalistik / Journal of Anomalistics, 24, 6.
- Bauer, H. H. (2013). The Pseudoscience Wars: Immanuel Velikovsky and the Birth of the Modern Fringe by Michael D. Gordin. Journal of Scientific Exploration, 27.
- Bauer, H. H. (2022). On the Fringe: Where Science Meets Pseudoscience by Michael D. Gordin: Essay Review: Speaking of “Pseudo-Science” Entails Scientism: The Importance of Not Being Earnest about Science. Journal of Scientific Exploration, 36, pp. 512–519. https://doi.org/10.31275/20222449
More questions answered
- Pool the effect sizes across every ganzfeld study you hold and compare your number to the published Storm and Tressoldi meta-analyses—do they agree?
- Has the effect size for PK data increased in the last 50 years?
- Tell me about the clairvoyance work of the last 50 years
- What trends can you see in precognition research?
- What trends can you see in ESP research in the last 50 years?
- What are parapsychology's current arguments to justify that the phenomena are real and should be taken seriously?